Three Methodological Problems in Memory Science (2023 - 2025)

Abstract

The proposed project addresses the philosophical dimensions of current controversies in memory science, which links the psychology of memory to its physical basis. Memory science is in an exciting state of flux, resulting from a series of provocative studies and setbacks in the dominant paradigm. The primary objective of this project is to resolve three related problems that contribute to this state of flux. First, what phenomena relevant to memory science can be demonstrated? This is a demonstration problem. Second, where can the physical basis of memory be located? This is a localization problem. Third, by what set of criteria can memory be distinguished from non-memory? This is a demarcation problem. Together, these heretofore unresolved problems suggest that memory might depart from intuitive, scientific, and philosophical notions. With this, these problems challenge widely accepted commitments and paradigmatic success stories in cognitive science and neuroscience, as scientific study of the mind and brain long has been directed by insights about memory. At their cores, these problems are manifestations of topics in philosophy of science. They each concern a dimension of how the targets of scientific investigation are determined. For this reason, the proposed project adopts the stance that traction on resolving these problems and therefore settling these controversies can be made by philosophically analyzing memory science and its current state of flux. However, this project will do more than only settle existing controversies in memory science. These outcomes will also supply new insights into classic problems in philosophy of science. Further, these insights will have a firm basis in the realities of the scientific practice, its history, and its future. These insights will serve as a basis for informing naturalistic philosophical accounts that appeal to memory, including in epistemology, personal identity, and ethics.

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