Idea & Motivation
Logic is often regarded as neutral within a theoretical and conceptual framework.
On a traditional view, it is topic-neutral and metaphysically neutral: its laws and principles apply irrespective of subject matter, abstracting from the particular domains to which they are applied. In this sense, logic provides a framework for reasoning independently of what we are reasoning about. Moreover, as a scientific discipline, logic is commonly expected to be neutral with respect to social and political commitments. Given its high degree of abstraction, this expectation may be particularly strong in the case of logic.
At the same time, the purely theoretical view of logic has increasingly been challenged by research practices and the use of logical devices. Within a practical framework, philosophers and logicians have questioned whether logic is genuinely neutral. For instance, debates over logical pluralism, expressive power, and domain pertinence raise questions about whether topic-neutrality can be sustained. Others have considered whether logic can, in practice, be disentangled from the social and institutional contexts in which it is developed, taught, and applied.
This workshop will examine the idea of logical neutrality from multiple perspectives.
Confirmed Speakers
- Diderik Batens (University of Ghent)
- Franz Berto (University of St Andrews)
- Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
- Christian Damböck (LMU/University of Vienna)
- Maria J. Frápolli Sanz (University of Granada)
- María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz (Czech Academy of Sciences)
- Gillian Russell (Australian National University)
- Sara L. Uckelman (Durham University)
Acknowledgement
The workshop is generously funded by the mentoring program.