Title:
The role of uncertainty in debates about cognition
Abstract:
Minimal cognition is one of several approaches that present themselves as alternatives to “mainstream” perspectives in the study of cognition, where both what cognition is and what systems count as cognitive are challenged. While supporters of these approaches offer argumentative and empirical support for their positions, what is less explicitly discussed is the role that uncertainty plays in motivating these positions and structuring the kinds of argument and evidence that are put forward. Specifically, consideration of these approaches make salient that “mainstream” perspectives often, I posit, involve uncertainty regarding claims germane to: (1) whether empirical paradigms used to diagnose cognitive systems can serve to determinethem, (2) whether cognitive status can be empirically confirmed or must be inferred, and (3) whether cognition includes (often folk) psychological notions or is distinct from them. In this talk, I defend my posit of individual- or group-level uncertainties about these claims and make rigorous their beneficial role in making conjectures about the intension and extension of the concept COGNITION. These approaches reflect strategies that should be taken in the face of uncertainty.