Title:
Fixing Epistemic Norms with Question-Sensitive Belief
Abstract:
Thomas Kroedel (2026) recently posed several objections against positive norms of belief. In particular, he argues against the validity of a knowledge-first norm of belief (N): if you are in a position to know p, then you ought to believe p. Kroedel shows that sometimes, we lack the capacity to believe, even if we ought to by (N): the norm violates the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Furthermore, Kroedel argues that the norm leads to irrational consequences. In this talk, I show that understanding belief as question-sensitive successfully rebuts both types of objection. Making the move to question-sensitive belief is independently motivated. While thus saving (N) for question-sensitive belief, the move raises further issues concerning the viability of intra- and inter-question norms, both governing what to believe and which questions to ask.