Title:
What is an Agent? The Case for a Null Answer
Abstract:
Concepts of agency are invoked in explanations, models, theories, and predictions in many different sciences, from evolutionary biology to computer science and economics. In order to understand and assess the work in these sciences, therefore, it is crucial to understand these appeals to “agency.” To make progress in this, the paper makes the case for three interrelated conclusions. First, the best way to understand the question about the nature of agency is as a question about defensible scientific uses of the concept of agency—not a purely metaphysical-philosophical question, nor a purely interpretationist question. Second, the paper seeks to show that there is not one right answer about what an agent, in general, is (and so we should be eliminativists about the general concept of agency). Third, though, it also shows that this is not problematic, as in specific scientific contexts such as economics and biology, there are defensible views of agency in that context. In short: there is no need for a general concept of agency.