Research profile
Chair of Practical Philosophy and Ethics (Prof. Dr. Monika Betzler)

Chair of Practical Philosophy and Ethics (Prof. Dr. Monika Betzler)
Normative ethics deals with the question of right action as well as what constitutes a good person or a good life. On the one hand, we examine historical philosophical positions on what exactly makes an action right and a person or their life good, with a particular focus on the ethics of Immanuel Kant. On the other hand, we address both questions from a systematic perspective: What moral theories exist, and how do they differ? How can a coherent moral theory be formulated that aligns with our moral intuitions while also being able to critically revise them? How can various moral theories deal with empirical uncertainty? Do persons have inherent value? What is well-being? What are moral rights? Is it permissible to aggregate the rights or harms of different people to reach an overall moral judgment? Can artificial intelligence possess rights? How do theories of the right differ from theories of the good? How can values be categorized? What do we owe to future generations? Is there moral progress, and if so, what does it consist of? Is there such a thing as moral expertise? What is moral understanding? How can moral-theoretical considerations be applied to concrete cases?
One of the research focuses of the chair is the ethics of close relationships. Specific forms of relationships such as love, friendship, partnership, and collegiality are subjected to detailed analysis, and the justification of partiality within impartial moral theories is examined.
In addition, there are research projects in the areas of empirical methods in ethics, population ethics, distributive justice, and the ethics of migration.
Moral psychology primarily focuses on the question of which mental states or attitudes are relevant for moral action and general rational action over time, as well as which mental factors may undermine our moral and rational behavior. We explore the value of empathy and trust, moral indifference, and the significance of moral emotions or attitudes such as grief, blame, and protest. Particular attention is given to the conditions of moral responsibility: what exactly justifies holding a person responsible, and what is required for a sincere apology? Another focus is the explanation of expressive and collective action.
In relation to rational action over time, we are interested in phenomena such as autonomy and self-control, commitment, self-deception, and weakness of will, as well as the rationality of retrospective attitudes and emotions like regret.
Metaethics primarily addresses questions of epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind as they relate to morality. Can actions be objectively morally right or wrong, or are we systematically mistaken if we assume they can be? How can we develop moral beliefs, and do these beliefs refer to facts in the world, or do they merely express our own feelings? Are we automatically motivated to act in accordance with what we believe to be morally right?
Our interest at the Chair lies on the one hand in a relational explanation of moral normativity. Are moral relationships fundamental in ethics, and if so, in what areas? On the other hand, we research the normativity of non-moral phenomena, such as the normativity of personal projects. In this context, the Chair also engages with foundational questions of legal philosophy, both historically and systematically. The focus is primarily on the nature and normativity of law, as well as the relationship between law and morality.
Furthermore, we investigate the normativity of rights. Finally, we are interested in what follows for metaethics from the relationship between moral traditions (Kantianism, consequentialism, contractualism). Can these traditions be reconciled, and if so, would this be good news for moral realists, or would it give rise to new problems?
Title | Name | Funded by | Time period |
---|---|---|---|
Kant on Emotions | Dr. Alix Cohen | Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation | 2024 - 2025 |
Artificial Intelligence and Distributive Justice | Dr. Korbinian Rüger | BIDT | 2022 - 2024 |
Methods of Practical Ethics | PD Dr. Norbert Paulo | DFG Heisenberg-Program | 2024 - 2027 |
Thought Experiments in Practical Philosophy | PD Dr. Norbert Paulo | DFG | 2024 - 2027 |
Praise and Proportionality |
Dr. Marta Johansson Werkmäster | Sven and Dagmar Salén Foundation | 2024 - 2025 |
Epistemic Manipulation | Melanie Sarzano | Swiss National Science Foundation | 2024 - 2025 |
A Relational Ethics of Manipulation | Dr. Michael Klenk | Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation | 2024 - 2027 |
Empathy, sharing and mental voyeurism | Dr. Radu Bumbacea | DFG | 2025-2027 |