Sofia Bonicalzi, Ph.D.
Associate Researcher
Lehrstuhl für Philosophy of Mind
Background
She is an Assistant Professor (RTD - B) in Moral Philosophy (M-FIL/03, with Scientific Habilitation) at the Department of Philosophy, Communication and Performing Art, Roma Tre University. She is also affiliated with the Cognition, Value and Behavior research group at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
She works on moral philosophy, philosophy of mind/action, philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology from an interdisciplinary perspective. Her current research focuses on the philosophy and neuroscience of volition, action and responsibility. Previously, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL (Action and Body Group), at the School of Advanced Study (University of London), where she was also a team member of The Human Mind Project, and at the Chair of Philosophy of Mind, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Pavia and has been a visiting Ph.D. candidate at the Sage School of Philosophy, at Cornell University.
SELECTED Publications
- Bonicalzi, S., Gallotti, M. (in press), “The participatory dimension of individual responsibility”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences;
- Beyer, F., Sidarus, N., Bonicalzi, S., Haggard, P. (2016), “Beyond self-serving bias: diffusion of responsibility reduces sense of agency and outcome monitoring”, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11 (12), pp. 1-8;
- Bonicalzi, S. (2015), “Libet-like experiments and the efficacy of the will”, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 6 (1), pp. 130-144;
- Bonicalzi, S. (2015), “Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility”, Phenomenology and Mind. Naturalism, the First-Person Perspective and the Embodied Mind, 7, pp. 128-135;
- Bonicalzi, S. (2013), “Moral Responsibility beyond Classical Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Accounts”, Prolegomena, 12 (1), pp. 21-41;
- Bonicalzi, S. (2013), “La Montagna Dipinta” (“The Painted Mountain”), Fata Morgana, 21, pp. 157-163;
- Bonicalzi, S. (2014), “Defining practical reasoning. Constructivism and Instrumental Reason”, in S. Bonicalzi, L. Caffo, M. Sorgon, eds., Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
- Bonicalzi, S. (2014), “Skepticism and Control”, in F. Bacchini, M. Dell’Utri, S. Caputo, eds., New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, pp. 144-164;
- Bonicalzi, S., M. De Caro (2013), “Introduction”, in Id., eds., “Free Will: Thirty points of view”, special issue of Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-4;
- Bonicalzi, S., M. De Caro (2013), eds., “Free Will: Thirty points of view”, special issue of Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3;
- Bonicalzi, S., L. Caffo, M. Sorgon (2014), eds., Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
Bonicalzi, S. (2012), review of John Martin Fischer, Deep Control. Essays on Free Will and Value, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, No. 3, Milano, Franco Angeli, pp. 643-646.