Simon Stromer, M.A.

Doktorand, Hilfskraft

Lehrstuhl für Praktische Philosophie und Ethik

Büroadresse:

Schellingstr. 10, 2. Stock

Raum J208

80799 München

Sprechstunde:

Üblicherweise Dienstag, 10–11 Uhr, und Mittwoch, 10–11 Uhr, nur nach Anmeldung unter calendly.com/s-stromer

Postanschrift:

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1

80539 München

Profil

Seit Juli 2022 promoviere ich betreut von Prof. Dr. Monika Betzler, LMU, und Prof. Dr. Christine Bratu, Universität Göttingen, über filiale Pflichten oder die Frage, was Erwachsene ihren Eltern schulden. Finanziert wird meine Promotion durch ein Promotionsstipendium der Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes (ab Juli 2023) beziehungsweise der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (April–Juni 2023). Neben familienethischen Fragen beschäftige ich mich außerdem unter anderem mit Fragen aus Debatten zu moralischer Verantwortung, Philosophy of Love, Philosophy of Sex, Bio-/Medizinethik und Philosophy of Migration. Nach dem Studium der Philosophie und der Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Bayreuth, dem University College London und der Sorbonne Université (Paris IV), habe ich im März 2022 einen Masterabschluss in Philosophie an der LMU München erworben. Außerhalb der Wissenschaft habe ich mehrjährige berufliche Erfahrungen in der politischen Kommunikation und dem Kulturmanagement.

Weitere Informationen

Working title: "From (no) Filial Duties to a Value-based Account of Familial Obligations"
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Monika Betzler, LMU, and Prof. Dr. Christine Bratu, University of Göttingen

What do adult children owe their parents? Or rather, what moral duties as, for instance, duties of care are justified in a parent–adult child relationship? And how are these duties justified? These are questions investigated in my doctoral research. There is a strong moral intuition that merely questioning if one should care for one’s parents and to what extent already makes one a "bad child“. In my thesis, I will defend the idea that from the mere existence of a legal or biological parent–child relation no (special) duty to, for instance, take care of one’s parents may be derived. Such a special duty would need to be justified by further normatively relevant factors. I will make fruitful the idea that to be justificatory for special duties, a relationship would need to have value and that these respective special duties are grounded in the specific value of the relationship. Adults who enjoy a––in a specific sense––valuable relationship with their parent would then owe it their parents to, for instance, take care of them. However, as my research into what that value actually entails and how a relationship may come to be valuable will show, such a special relationship is not necessarily a very widespread occurrence. As part of this doctoral project, I will also discuss what it means to be a parent––a biological or legal tie does not seem to be sufficient to speak of a for my argument normatively relevant relationship––and how a parent–adult child relationship should ideally be shaped.